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ABSTRACT: The paper's two theses are: First, that the historical and philosophical roots of 
argumentation are in ethics and politics, and not in any formal ideal, be it mathematical, scientific or 
other. Furthermore, argumentation is a human invention, deeply tied up with the emergence of 
democracy in ancient Greece. Second, that argumentation presupposes and advances concurrently 
humanistic values, especially the autonomy of the individual to think and decide in a free and 
uncoerced manner. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The thesis of this paper in a nutshell is as follows: If truth was accessible to people 
and its truthfulness visible to everyone, then there was no real sense to the 
existence of essential disputes and disagreements. Furthermore, if truth was 
accessible to people but its meaning was concealed from most of them, then the task 
of those who know the truth was to interpret and teach the truth to everyone else. 
The existence of disputes and disagreements in this case will be the mark of 
stupidity in one case or a sin of arrogance in the other. This is the Hermeneutical 
stance, where there is a hierarchy of acknowledged and skilful masters along with 
schismatic but regulated disagreements regarding the proper interpretation of the 
truth. The task of those at the top of the hierarchy who know the truth would be to 
explain it to those who have difficulties in its understanding, and to punish those 
who refuse to accept it. If there is truth, then it has to be interpreted, explained and 
taught, and sometimes, those who deny its truthfulness would have to be punished. 
Truthfully, however, not only that truth is not accessible to humans, its very 
existence is doubtful in the first place. The existence of substantial controversies 
and lack of common grounds for an accord in disputes is precisely one of the 
conspicuous marks of human reality. Yet, should we lament for this human reality 
and, thus, look desperately for the concealed and elusive source of truths? The 
Humanistic stance's answer is No, since the pretension to know about the existence 
of truth and its nature is nothing but a baseless feigning. Instead, we should 
resolutely dare to accept the fact that the existence of substantial controversies is 
precisely the distinctive mark of sound rationality and real understanding as to the 
nature of knowledge. Furthermore, the understanding that everyone can be wrong 
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is trivial, but that I can be wrong constitutes the right answer to the question of 
rationality. It is also the right answer to the question why argumentation theory 
should be understood to be based on humanistic values. 
This paper, thus, does not assume to argue for something new. These ideas 
are rooted in the humanistic tradition as well as in the Analytic philosophy, such as 
David Hume's Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Bertrand Russell's A 
History of Western Philosophy, Karl Popper's The Open Society and Its Enemies, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty, and Jürgen 
Habermas' Theory of Communicative Action. The purpose of this paper is to 
reemphasize these ideas with regard to argumentation, while stressing that these 
ideas are part of the broader ideological context of humanism. This approach 
proposes a solution to the problem of 'epistemological justification' as well. 
 
 
Figure 1: The Execution of Louis XVI by Henri Helman (1793-1794).1 
 
Louis XVI was trialled and executed on Monday, 21 January 1793 on the 
Place de la Révolution. However, it was not only an execution of a person but and 
above all the execution of his political body. This royal execution had a ritual aspect, 
                                                        
1 The caption reads: La mort de Louis Capet sur la Place de la Révolution présentée à la Convention 
Nationale le 30 Germinal par Helman. Etching and Engraving, 35 x 46 cm. Source: Institut national 
d'histoire de l'art. Retrieved: February 22, 2013: http://www.purl.org/yoolib/inha/6004. 
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which is symbolized by Helman in the above Figure 1: On the right, there is the 
empty pedestal that formerly supported Bouchardon's statue of Louis XV and was 
torn down on August 9, 1792, and is a compositional counterbalance to the 
guillotine on the left. These two events are together the embodiment of a 
symbolized monarchy and what it stands for that come to an end (Connerton, 1989, 
p. 9; de Baecque, 2001, pp. 86-119). Helman's print emphasizes the ritual of sacrifice 
by describing the moment in which the executioner holds the head up in front of the 
crowd while circling the scaffold.  
Susan Dunn sees in the public beheading of Louis XVI a central event in the 
French collective memory for two centuries (Dunn, 1994). In her book, chapter one: 
“The Cult of Human Sacrifice,” she examines the cultural and political meaning of the 
regicide and mentions the work of Marcel Mauss and Henri Hubert, Sacrifice: Its 
Nature and Function, 1898, (Hubert & Mauss, 1964). As Dunn describes, the 
humanistic freethinkers of the political left in French intellectual history politicized 
this act of regicide and were conscious to its ritual aspect: To signify a cultural and 
political revolution and change. For the Jacobins, the king's decapitation was the 
people's coronation. The event of the regicide is well rooted in Greek rituals and 
myths, as Walter Burkert states in his (Burkert, 1979, pp. 59-77), “Transformations 
of the Scapegoat”: “The process can be brought into a nearly perfect Lévi-Straussian 
formula, the scapegoat being the mediator who brings about the reversal from 
common danger to common salvation: the situation ‘community endangered’ versus 
‘individual distinguished’ is turned into ‘individual doomed’ versus ‘community 
saved’....” (Burkert, 1979, p. 67). The crowd in the Place de la Révolution knew 
perfectly well what the ritual of sacrifice means, since it is told that the crowd has 
cried, “Long live the nation! Long live the Republic!” (de Baecque, 2001, p. 100). 
They were echoing the Jacobins' understanding regarding the regicide's significance. 
These shouts of the crowd immediately following the execution show that 
the royal execution of Louis XVI was not just an act of vengeance. Dunn summarizes 
the symbolizing act in this royal execution when she writes: “the myth of a phoenix-
like republic rising from the blood of the dead king.” (Dunn, 1994, p. 20). The 
political debate between the Jacobins and the Girondins during the trial of Louis XVI 
emphasizes this point. The Girondins, who were against the execution, considered 
the execution unnecessary for the establishment of a republic and were repudiating 
the Jacobin exhortations. Joseph Guiter, one of the Girondins, viewed regicide as a 
“misguided form of human sacrifice” to freedom and equality (Dunn, 1994, pp. 21-
23).  
Yet, Helman's image shows a single moment of the royal execution, which has 
a distinctive symbolic value. Helman's image embodies a symbolic violence, the 
violence of a new regime against the ancien régime. It was a violent conflict for 
political and economic supremacy that resulted in exchange of social elites. But 
above all, it was supposed to signify the beginning of an old new culture in light of 
the ideas of the Enlightenment philosophers. It was the beginning of an era in which 
humanism has a leading role and argumentation as the mean for expressing 
rationality. It was the renewal of a culture, in which argumentation has a 
constitutive role.  
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2. THE HISTORICAL ASPECT 
 
The reason why disagreements and controversies are the very nature of 
argumentation and the reason for its creation are rooted in the philosophical and 
political revolutions of the 5th century B.C. This is the peak of the transition in the 
World Spirit from an era in which truths regarding politics, ethics and nature were 
considered sacred by the gods and tradition to an era in which these long standing 
truths are subjected to critical disputes in the new political atmosphere of 
democracy. The new democracy is part of a crucial cultural process, in which 
everything is put into question and doubt. Moreover, citizens in general and leaders 
in particular are expected to form their opinions and engage in controversies with 
opposing views in order to convince others.  
Democracy and philosophy of the 5th century B.C. are interconnected (Farrar, 
1988), and the upshot of this interconnection is the importance of argumentation. 
The reason is that argumentation can have a significant role only in a democratic 
environment based on humanistic values and ideas. It is quite clear that the Greek 
awareness of cultural and religious diversity enabled the Greek philosophers to 
form what in the 18th century came to be known as humanism and secularism. 
These values can prosper only in a free political environment and argumentation is 
needed for executing these values. 
One of the marks of this change in the World Spirit is the Sophists' concept of 
law and the difference between nomus and physis. It is the difference between the 
modern democratic definition of law (Weber, 1978, p. 671) and the non-democratic 
concept, which is based on traditional authority (Weber, 1978, p. 227). The creation 
of democracy made argumentation a necessary part public life and, consequently, of 
education, as clearly can be identified with the appearance of the Sophist 
philosophical movement at that time. 
The Greek philosophers of the classical era were aware of two philosophical-
social facts: First, that theories regarding nature, ethics, politics and so forth are 
mere opinions. It is the classical distinction between epistêmê and mere doxa; the 
distinction between genuine knowledge and mere confirmed belief, respectively. 
And it relates to the quality of the justification or evidence the confirmed belief in 
question is based upon. Nightingale describes how epistemic concepts, such as 
knowledge, thea, theôria, were conceptualized in the new tools of philosophy and 
what part did the cultural conditions played in this transformation (Nightingale, 
2004). Second, opinions are constantly changing in time and place. Thus, the 
perpetual situation of controversies and, moreover, the need for political and social 
means for their resolution. The democratic Greeks came to the conclusion that the 
integration of doxa or conjectures with public and free critical discussion is the only 
reliable foundation to knowledge. 
The story of Protagoras tells the story of Greek culture and politics of the 5th 
century B.C. His life as a wanderer teacher of philosophy gave him a unique and 
revolutionary point of view regarding human nature and society. The sophists saw 
disputes regarding the many aspects of human life, as moral and religious issues. 
The absence of centralized political power on the one hand and self-governing city-
states on the other hand, as well as constant contacts with other cultures through 
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commerce, gave the Greeks this prevailing point of view to question truths and 
traditions. The outcome with which philosophers such as Protagoras had to deal 
with was the collapse of tradition and a wide social turmoil. Protagoras' 
philosophical relativism, but more important, his humanist and democratic 
inclinations, were shaped with these events in mind (Levi, 1940; Schiller, 1911; 
Scenters-Zapico, 1993).  
His relativistic principle of the man-measure (Schiappa, 2003) is the key to a 
better understanding of his approach to logic and rhetoric (Mendelson, 2002). This 
principle constitutes philosophical relativism in its modern understanding. But 
more important is that, according to Protagoras, humanistic values, such as the 
autonomy of the individual, necessarily follows this principle. The relativist 
philosophical climate of the Sophist movement is interwoven with the political 
nature of the newly established democracy in Greek city-states.  
In the absence of religious and traditional authorities to solve conflicts, there 
was the need for an alternative procedure for resolving conflicts. Protagoras and 
other pro-democratic philosophers thought that argumentation and critical 
discourse are part of the solution to this new situation. His relativism rejects the 
notion that all personal beliefs are equally accepted, and argues that some are 
'better' than others. Critical discussion as an inter-subjective process is the basis for 
his position and, consequently, his emphasize on the need to teach rhetoric and 
logic. This process, however, has a meaning only in democratic environment with 
the proper education to its citizens (Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1422a). Here one can see the 
more decisive reason to the controversy between Protagoras and the sophist 
movement on the one hand and the anti-democratic philosophers, such as Plato and 
Aristophanes, on the other hand (Moore, 1988). 
It all begins with the principle of the man-measure (DK80b1): “Of all things 
the measure is man, of the things that are, that [or "how"] they are, and of things 
that are not, that [or "how"] they are not.” This principle can be understood on two 
levels: The humanistic level, in which every person is equal regarding all things and 
each person counts; and the epistemological level, in which knowledge is drastically 
different from person to person. However, Protagoras coincides with Parmenides 
when he assumes that people have the ability to judge for themselves what is and 
what is not: "on every issue there are two arguments opposed to each other 
(DK80A12), although without the hope for any certainty. This is the Dissoi Logoi 
statement of the ancient rhetorical practice of arguing both sides of an issue. Its 
epistemological justification is that knowledge is contingent upon circumstance and 
language (Mendelson, 2002, pp. 1-134). Richard Rorty summarizes the idea in 
modern terms as follows: "Truth cannon be out there - cannot exist independently 
of the human mind - because sentences cannot so exist or be out there. The world is 
out there, but descriptions of the world are not." (Rorty, 1989, p. 5). 
This relativism, in which opposing arguments can be argued equally well 
from either side (DK80A20) is not mere rhetorical tricks, but an essential 
philosophical meaning of what democracy is. Protagoras was known for claiming 
that he can make the weaker argument appear the stronger (DK80A21), but he did 
so for a purpose (Farrar, 1988, pp. 63-64). Protagoras says that he can make and 
teach other to make the apparently less persuasive argument onto the more 
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persuasive, and this can be taught. If one can strengthen both sides of a question, 
then one can point out what was at stake in the controversy. The aim of this process 
of exploring opposing claims is to discover the more acceptable one. But what is 
important in this process is that no one disputant can trump the others by appealing 
to some privileged access to truth or authority, as is expected in the Hermeneutical 
stance. Furthermore, the man-measure principle endorses the democratic ideals, as 
it makes no reference to differences in people's status: every man is the measure 
equally.  
 
3. THE PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECT 
 
Argumentation derives its philosophical essence from the fact that every person can 
be mistaken – and me in particular – since every belief people have is flawed to 
begin with. The use of argumentation is the only rational way to deal with these 
facts (Popper, 2002, pp. 67-68). Beginning with the Greek philosophy of the classical 
era, the Humanistic stance is formed and with its creation also the solely reliance on 
human reason and knowledge. The only way to justify knowledge is in accordance 
with the ideal of free and public critical inquiry (Popper, 1966). There is no other 
way to justify knowledge which will accord with humanistic values. In particular, 
there is no divine revelation accessible only to elected people or some concealed 
procedure known only to holy men or wizards. These traits signify the 
Hermeneutical stance, in which any knowledge is legitimate only if it can be 
interpreted in view of the established absolute truths. Moreover, interpreting the 
truths is the prerogative of a well-defined élite, while most people are excluded 
from participating in this process (Weber, 1978, p. 227). The discussion of disputes 
and controversies in the Hermeneutical stance is reserved only to the élite members, 
while the existence of controversies is mostly denied or at least minimized.  
The revolutionary insight of Greek philosophy is that beliefs cannot ever be 
rational supported or justified in any conclusive way. However, fallible knowledge is 
possible in two senses: (1) Epistemological speaking, knowledge and gaining 
knowledge is an acceptable fact of human history, although it always involves 
fallibility. It is considered a more realistic conception of knowledge, which is based 
on tolerance regarding conflicting opinions. And (2) normatively speaking, not only 
science but culture, politics and ethics should also reflect this epistemological state 
of affairs. And this epistemological state of affairs is not a shortcoming of human 
knowledge but a moral value of tolerance and autonomy. This is the place where the 
tight connection between scepticism on the one hand and humanism and democracy 
on the other is located. The essence of argumentation begins with this tight 
connection and with the dispute regarding the justification of the democratic way of 
life. The revolutionary novelty of critical discussion is bound with the need for 
means to resolve controversies in the way of rational persuasion.  
The Hermeneutical stance is a receptive stance, since it begins with the belief 
that necessary truths are in need of interpretation and teaching. The affinity 
between the Hermeneutical stance and a totalitarian regime of any sort is the need 
to believe in necessary truths. This affinity is the epistemological reason why there 
is no place for free and open discussion in any totalitarian regime, since there 
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always will be some absolute truths, dictated by some authority or élite. Coercion in 
totalitarian regimes can come in different forms and degrees. But all of them 
function, at least in part, as means for eliminating opposition to the institutional 
truth. This is the epistemological reason why there is an imbedded threat in 
philosophical Skepticism and humanistic values for totalitarian regimes (Arendt, 
2004; Popper, 1966). 
Logic was invented and shaped out of a tight connection with the humanistic 
basic rights, which is possible only in democracy. Logic makes sense only with 
personal and political freedom. From its beginning in Greek philosophy, these 
connections were the raison d'être that shaped logic in the following sense (Berti, 
1978): Freedom of expression and the need to achieve collective decisions without 
coercion presuppose the need for open discussion and the use of reasoned 
persuasion. But it begins with anthropocentric convergence of the three Kantian 
questions humans must ask in order to cope with their existence: What can I know? 
What shall I do? What may I hope for? These questions become humanistic only 
when the way to answer them is bestowed with certain normative basic 
assumptions. Most importantly is the stipulation that every human being is always 
more than a means for the purpose of others, but rather, a purpose in him-herself 
(Kant, 2008, p. 33). In this respect, humanism opposes any form of non-democratic 
way of life. 
How do argumentation, humanism and democracy come to be connected? 
Humanism is analyzed in different ways in view of the diversity of contexts in which 
it is done. The following normative basic assumptions conceptualize humanism 
according to the relevance of argumentation in the context of democracy: 
 
(a) The ontological basic assumption: Human reason comes to know 
nature without any supernatural arbiter(s). Knowledge in any known 
tradition in the human history is always depended on the existing of 
at least one arbiter supernatural being, whose judgment or knowledge 
is deemed authoritative. The humanistic stance leaves human beings 
as the solely source of knowledge. Extra or super-natural beings are 
excluded from the participant entities relevant to knowledge and, 
thus, transforming knowledge humanistic. 
(b) The epistemological basic assumption: Knowledge should avoid being 
ethno or cultural centered. Yet again, knowledge in any known 
tradition in the human history always tended to project its own 
cultural perspective on nature (Morris, 2006, pp. 1-26). The 
humanistic stance aspires to objectivity, at least as a regulative ideal 
which avoids ethnocentrism. 
(c) The ethical-political basic assumption: Human reason should be 
autonomous and unbiased in the sense that human beings are free 
from external and internal coercion. The humanistic stance sees the 
freedom of thought as universal, in the sense that every participant in 
a discussion is like everybody else, since no one has a particular 
authority for deciding debates. 
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Of course, these basic assumptions are only an ideal construction, 
functioning in a regulative manner. But these assumptions function as a moving 
force in the cultural history of knowledge, such as science, politics and more. These 
normative basic assumptions explain why certain meta-theoretical principles are 
chosen for constituting argumentation theories rather than others, such as the 
meta-theoretical principles of pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren, et al., 1996, p. 
ch.10). 
They are normative in nature since they are contrary to human actuality and 
history. Needless to say that the common way to resolve controversies is by the use 
of force and violence, and probably it is also the most effective one. Some of the 
Sophist philosophers came to this conclusion, such as Callicles or Thrasymachus. 
Callicles argues that it is an anthropological and social fact regarding human nature 
as such. Thrasymachus goes even further and turns this observation into a moral 
statement by arguing that the ability to force something is the criterion for its being 
justified (Barney, 2004). See also (Bett, 2002; Dillon & Gergel, 2003). Political 
murder is an instance to such a view, in which the use of violence is intended to 
cause an important political change. Caesar's murder in the Roman senate hall is an 
instance to such an act and an ironic instance as well (Canfora, 2007), as is well 
dramatized in Shakespeare's Julius Caesar (Taylor, 1973). 
  
 
Figure 2: , Jean-Léon Gérôme, The Death of Caesar (1867). 2 
 
Thrasymachus' moral philosophy is relevant to the present discussion since 
his insistence on justice being the prerogative of the strongest is also a critical 
                                                        
2 Gérôme, Jean-Léon (1824-1904). The Death of Caesar (1867). Painting, oil on canvas. 85.5 x 145.5 
cm. Walters Art Museum (United States). Retrieved: March, 2, 2013, Wikimedia Commons: 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Gerome_Death_of_Caesar.jpg . 
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reflection on the modern view that moral values are the product of social 
constructivism. Furthermore, his cynical realism is an expected consequence to the 
skeptical inclinations of the sophist philosophy in general. However, given the basic 
relativist nature of humanism, pluralism and social heterogeneity are an expected 
social state of affairs, which should be addressed according the humanistic 
principles. Western countries have to cope with multicultural society, and the 
question nowadays is what the suitable solution is. The determination that the 
democratic political sphere is the right place for solving or settling disputes 
(Williams, 2005; Williams, 2006) makes its fullest sense only in humanism.  
The very idea of 'social contract' is the decision to solve or settle disputes by 
using arguments, as in John Rawls' theory of justice as fairness (Rawls, 1999). His 
theory tries to avoid the use of violence, especially against people, and not from the 
abhorrence of the use of force in principle. His main procedure uses, as can be 
expected, the idea of argumentation as a preferable mean: 
 
If the public forum is to be free and open to all, and in continuous session, everyone 
should be able to make use of it... Moreover, they should have a fair chance to add 
alternative proposals to the agenda for political discussion... (Rawls, 1999, p. 255) 
Discussion is a way of combining information and enlarging the range of arguments. 
At least in the course of time, the effects of common deliberation seem bound to 
improve matters. Thus we arrive at the problem of trying to formulate an ideal 
constitution of public deliberation in matters of justice... (p. 358). 
 
Argumentation is the means for critical discourse and the rational way to 
deal with controversies. The meaning of this assertion is that argumentation is a 
tool. It is not a discovery of something which pre-existed to its formulation. 
Argumentation exists as a philosophical, cultural and social artifact, just as the rules 
of chess or abstract art are. Part of its essence is that full and objective verification is 
unattainable; only conjectures or hypotheses, their confirmation and sometimes 
also their possible refutation.  
 
4. ARGUMENTATION HUMANIZED  
 
In what sense does argumentation reflect or ought to reflect humanism? There is a 
philosophical tendency beginning with the sophist philosophy and currently central 
to Analytic oriented philosophy, which is expressed in the above mentioned citation 
form Richard Rorty: "Truth cannon be out there - cannot exist independently of the 
human mind - because sentences cannot so exist or be out there. The world is out 
there, but descriptions of the world are not." (Rorty, 1989, p. 5). The above 
ontological basic assumption compels us to accept scepticism giving the poor 
cognitive abilities of human beings 
The last statement would be clearer in context of the old tension between 
discovering objective truths and forming conjectures. It is the old tension between 
two philosophical approaches to the understanding of the nature of mathematics 
and logic: Platonism and psychologism (or anti-Platonism). Although 'psychologism' 
has many variations (Balaguer, 1998), it is sufficient for the present purpose. 
Michael Dummett, one of the sever critics of Platonism, writes: 
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The extrusion of thoughts from the mind initiated by Bolzano led to what is often 
termed "Platonism," as exemplified by Frege's mythology of the "third realm": for, if 
thoughts are not contents of the mind, they must be located in a compartment of 
reality distinct both from the physical world and the inner world of private 
experience. This mythology served Frege and Husserl as a bulwark against the 
psychologism which they opposed. If, now, our capacity for thought is equated with, 
or at least explained in terms of, our ability to use language, no such bulwark is 
required: for language is a social phenomenon, in no way private to the individual, 
and its use is publicly observable (Dummett, 1994, p. 131). 
 
This is the reason, Dummett argues, why the Linguistic Turn of the Analytic 
Philosophy is faithful to the empiricist tradition. This is, for example, the meta-
theoretical principle of 'socializing' in pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren, et al., 1996, 
p. ch.10). The belief in objective truth entails the belief in objective entities, which 
are neither empirical nor mental. Platonism endorses a third possibility, which is an 
"ideal sphere" or "third realm" (Frege, 1893, p. 204). More importantly for the 
following is the consequential assertion regarding rules and methodology. The laws 
pertaining to reasoning do not depend upon neither psychology nor pragmatics and, 
thus, should exist independently; they are neither the product nor the content of 
mental states. They supposed to occupy an "ideal sphere" and, thus, are discovered 
rather than invented or created. 
However, the linguistic turn in the philosophy of the 20th century preserves 
the objectivity of argumentation as a social phenomenon while avoiding ontological 
mythology by locating rules of 'verification' outside the mind (Dummett, 1994, p. 
25). Argumentation should be located in the spatio-temporal world of inter-
subjective reality. This does not mean that logic is grounded in psychology or 
renders it or its subject matter to pure "subjectivism" or "private". It does affirm 
that argumentation is grounded on an empirical basis. This does not rule out, 
however, the distinction between ideal or normative on the one hand and real or 
empirical on the other regarding logical entities and laws pertaining to them. They 
are ontologically dependent upon actually existing languages and their speakers. 
The knowledge of them is epistemologically grounded in knowledge of empirical 
observations about language, the rules of linguistic communities in the sense of 
language game, and the variety of the individual behavior of their members.  
This anti-Platonist approach has its difficulties, as Willard shows (Willard, 
1984). Still, there is nothing wrong in itself with laws of logic being contingent and 
that our knowledge of them is a posteriori as long as there is a substantial place for 
their being normative as well. The rules of argumentation are changing over time 
and this is verified on the basis of empirical study of cultures and linguistic 
communities. The normative dimension of argumentation is the projection of the 
ethical and political ideals. Humanism is both the historical source for its creation 
and the ideal argumentation is supposed to fulfill.  
 
5. IN FAVOR OF MINIMAL EPISTEMOLOGY  
 
The three normative basic assumptions have as advantage over more specific 
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approached to argumentation, which can be exemplified with regards to the known 
controversy over the issue of epistemological theory of argumentation.  
Some theories of argumentation emphasize the epistemological standards of 
argumentation in the form of true justified beliefs, as Siegel and Biro (Biro & Siegel, 
1992; Siegel & Biro, 1997; Biro & Siegel, 2006). However, these argumentation 
theories are epistemological in the sense of traditional philosophical understanding 
of normative epistemology. This epistemological approach to argumentation does 
not only focus on justified beliefs, but connects these justified beliefs to objective 
"truth conditions". Their rational standards would be truth-conditions oriented and 
will emphasize objectivity, which would be in accordance with some version of a 
correspondence theory of truth. 
Non-epistemological theories of argumentation, on the other hand, would 
adhere to rational standards in argumentation, which are more discourse oriented, 
and would be sensitive to the fact that these standards are relative to communities. 
Although scientific communities might be regarded as a preferable model, the 
sensitivity to community would still be the key factor. They are inter-subjective or 
inter-personal standards, since philosophical relativism or scepticism in general 
would be incompatible with any real objective truth and truth conditions and, 
consequently, any full-fledged Correspondence Theory. Instead, standards of 
acceptability or reasonableness would be relative to a dialectical discourse in a 
given community. 
The debate regarding epistemologically oriented argumentation theory is 
only one case in the more broad controversy regarding the correct methodology of 
argumentation theory. The diverse specifications for what would count as the 
correct criteria for sound or good argumentation are almost equal to the numbers of 
theoreticians in this field. The controversy regarding the proper justification criteria 
for epistemically good arguments misses the point of argumentation. Some given set 
of such criteria might be appropriate in some given field but not in another. This is a 
point well known from the works of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca and to some 
degree also from the work of Hamblin. Furthermore, argumentation theories can be 
distinguished according to their preferred criteria of sound or good argumentation. 
To begin with, an argumentation theory is not a philosophical theory, but a 
field-oriented theory with its background in a specific philosophical approach. Its 
methodology and aims are formed in light of its preferred philosophical and 
epistemological approach. For instance, pragma-dialect is a theory of argumentation 
that should be understood in light of the critical rationality approach in philosophy. 
Epistemological theories of argumentation should be understood in a similar 
manner. Thus, each argumentation theory suffers from all the known shortcomings 
of its philosophical approach.  
The reference point to the whole discussion is that the issue of philosophical 
relativism in its fallibilist version is inevitable. Enormous but futile work has been 
done in trying to refute Fallibilism from variety of motivations. Thomas Nagel 
summed up the issue by saying that skepticism is both irrefutable and inescapable 
(Nagel, 1979). Thus, epistemological theories of argumentation will need to specify 
a positive concept of justification, while it is clear, to begin with, that no 
philosophical consensus can be attained on such an issue. Furthermore, even if a 
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controversy has been resolved to the satisfaction of its participants, it is still an open 
question whether it was a justified resolution in epistemological terms. However, an 
objective and obligatory answer to such a question is not possible in philosophical 
terms.  
On the other hand, if such resolution has satisfied the above three normative 
basic assumptions, then the resolution can be termed 'argumentative'. Given the 
variety of possible resolutions, such as the use of violence, the justification for the 
distinction between argumentative resolution and any other kind of resolutions can 
be given in terms of these normative basic assumptions.  
If argumentative theories are to be relevant to actual uses of arguments, they 
cannot deal with the lessons of skepticism by claiming that skepticism is 
unconvincing, counter-intuitive, or by disregarding the demands of our ordinary 
concept of knowledge. There is no way but to acknowledge that there is no 
'objective' justification for knowledge-claims that will stand the counter-arguments 
of skepticism. However, by adopting the humanistic approach to argumentation as a 
necessary condition for any argumentation theory, two goals can be satisfied: First, 
a normative approach to argumentation, which acknowledge its origin and essence 
as a choice for a democratic form of life. Second, defining guiding rules for possible 
methodologies and aims that will be consider legitimate for argumentative theories, 
and will term these argumentative theories humanistic. 
 
 
Figure 3: Jeens (1827–1879), The Controversy, 1868.3 
                                                        
3 "The Controversy" (France in the time of Louis XIV) engraved by C. H. Jeens, published in The Art 
Journal, 1868. Steel engraved. It was made after an engraving by Alfred Elmore, "The Controversy" 
(1840-1879). Retrieved February 22, 2013: http://www.mersc-prints.co.uk/The%20Controversy%20c.jpg. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
Logic is the mean to persuade in the absence of truth. Where there are only 
conjectures and beliefs, one can only speak about the better one. Persuasion can be 
achieved in many ways, but the humanistic decision is to cling to the ideal of 
argumentation as a mean for rational decision. Only in this way, the basic values of 
autonomy of the individual and his human dignity can be preserved. It is part of the 
historical background of constructing argumentation and its philosophical essence. 
The ideology of humanism prevails in the Western culture with the fall of the ancien 
régime in the French revolution, and the concept of controversy becomes 
fundamental in the public culture. In an engraving from 1868, Sir Jeens describes 
one of the more heated controversies of European Enlightenment, the controversy 
between Freethought and the various dogmatic ideologies. This and other 
controversies characterize the society in Western Europe of the 18th century with its 
turning secular. The public debates as an essential characteristic of liberal 
democracy is the meaning for me of the phrase "Virtues of Argumentation". 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Arendt, H. (2004). The origins of totalitarianism (1st ed. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1995. 2nd ed.). 
New York: Schocken Books. 
Balaguer, M. (1998). Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Barney, R. (2011, October). Callicles and Thrasymachus. (E. N. Zalta, Ed.) Retrieved June 30, 2013, 
from The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/callicles-
thrasymachus/#6.   
Berti, E. (1978). Ancient Greek Dialectic as Expression of Freedom of Thought and Speech. Journal of 
the History of Ideas, 39(3), 347-370. 
Bett, R. (2002). Is There a Sophistic Ethics? Ancient Philosophy, 22(3), 235-262. 
Biro, J., & Siege, H. (1992). Normative, argumentaion and an epistemic theory of fallacies. In F. H. van 
Eemeren (Ed.), Argumentation illuminated (pp. 85-103). Amsterdam: SicSat. 
Biro, J., & Siegel, H. (2006). In defence of the objective epistemic approach to argumentation. Informal 
Logic, 26(1), 91-101. 
Burkert, W. (1979). Structure and history in Greek mythology and ritual. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Canfora, L. (2007). Julius Caesar:the life and times of the people’s dictator (English language ed.). (M. 
Hill, & K. Windle, Trans.) Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Connerton, P. (1989). How societies remember. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
de Baecque, A. (2001). Glory and terror: seven deaths under the French Revolution. (C. Mandell, Trans.) 
New York: Routledge. 
Dillon, J., & Gergel, T. (2003). The Greek Sophists. Great Britain: Penguin Group. 
Dummett, M. A. (1994). Origins of analytical philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Dunn, S. (1994). The deaths of Louis XVI: regicide and the French political imagination. Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press. 
Farrar, C. (1988). The origins of democratic thinking: the invention of politics in classical Athens. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Frege, G. (1893). Grundgesetze Der Arithmetik. In M. Beaney (Ed.), The Frege Reader (M. Beaney, 
Trans., 1997 English ed., Vol. I, pp. 194-223). Oxford: Blackwell. 
Guthrie, W. K. (1967). A History of Greek Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hubert, H., & Mauss, M. (1964). Sacrifice: its nature and function (Translated from the French 1898 
ed.). (W. Halls, Trans.) Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
MENASHE SCHWED 
14 
Johnson, R. (2000). Manifest Rationality: A Pragmatic Theory of Argument. Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates. 
Kant, I. (2008). Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals. (L. Denis, Ed., & T. K. Abbott, Trans.) 
Bradford VA: Wilder Publication. 
Levi, A. (1940). The Ethical and Social Thought of Protagoras. Mind, 49(195), 284-302. 
Margolis, J. (1991). The truth about relativism. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Mendelson, M. (2002). Many sides: a Protagorean approach to the theory, practice and pedagogy of 
argument. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Mendelson, M. (2002). Many sides: a Protagorean approach to the theory, practice and pedagogy of 
argument. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Moore, S. (1988). Democracy and commodity exchange: Protagoras versus Plato. Histroy of 
Philosophy Quarterly, 5, 357-368. 
Morris, B. (2006). Religion and anthropology: a critical introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Nagel, T. (1979). Mortal Questions, (15th printing 2012 ed.). New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Nightingale, A. W. (2004). Spectacles of truth in Classical Greek philosophy: theoria in its cultural 
context. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Popper, K. R. (1966). The Open Society and its Enemies. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Popper, K. R. (2002). Conjectures and refutations: The growth of scientiﬁc knowledge (5th ed. rev. ed.). 
London: Routledge. 
Rawls, J. (1999). A theory of justice (Originally published in 1971. Rev. ed.). Cambridge, Mass.: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
Rorty, R. (1989). Contingency, irony, and solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Scenters-Zapico, J. (1993). The Case for the Sophists. Rhetoric Review, 11(2), 352-367. 
Schiappa, E. (2003). Protagoras and "logos": a study in Greek philosophy and rhetoric (2nd ed.). 
Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press. 
Schiller, F. C. (1911). The Humanism of Protagoras. Mind, 20(78), 181-196. 
Siegel, H., & Biro, J. (1997). Epistemic normativity, argumentation, and fallacies. Argumentation, 
11(3), 277-292. 
Taylor, M. (1973). Shakespeare's Julius Caesar and the Irony of History. Shakespeare Quarterly, 24(3), 
301-308. 
van Eemeren, F. H., Grootendorst, R., Snoeck Henkemans, A., Blair, J., Johnson, R., Krabbe, E., . . . 
Zarefsky, D. (1996). Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory: A handbook of historical 
backgrounds and contemporary developments. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Weber, M. (1978). Economy and society: an outline of interpretive sociology. (G. Roth, C. Wittich, Eds., 
& E. Fischoff, Trans.) Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Willard, D. (1984). Logic and the Objectivity of Knowledge. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press. 
Williams, B. A. (2005). In the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Williams, B. A. (2006). Philosophy as a humanistic discipline. (A. Moore, Ed.) Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
 
